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Abstract 
This paper examines the nexus between political instability and economic growth in 10 CEE 
countries in transition in the period 1990-2009. Our results support the contention that political 
instability defined as a propensity for government change had a negative impact on growth. On the 
other hand, there was no causality in the opposite direction. A sensitivity analysis based on the 
application of a few hundred different variants of the initial econometric model confirmed the 
abovementioned findings only in the case where major government changes were applied to the 
definition of political instability.  
Keywords: political instability, economic growth, CEE transition economies. 
 
Introduction 
The factors that determine economic growth are among the most extensively studied subjects in 
the economic literature. Early contributions on these topics were based mainly on the neoclassical 
growth model and were concerned almost exclusively with strictly economic determinants of growth. 
Insufficient data has caused that empirical literature on the relationship between political instability 
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and economic growth is relatively recent. Having said that, in one of the earliest contributions to the 
subject, Kuznets (1966) claimed that political disorder may be responsible for a low rate of economic 
growth, especially in periods of government change. In the early 1990s North (1990) said that a 
society’s institutional framework plays an important role in the long-term performance of an 
economy. Therefore, the choice of the political and economic system which would be best for the 
general development of a society (including economic growth), is an important research avenue for 
economists around the world.  
Economists usually stress that an unstable political system may slow down investment or speed 
up inflation, and in consequence reduce the GDP growth rate. Theoretically, an inverse relationship 
is also possible. The economic troubles of a country may constitute major factor in social tensions 
and political instability, which in turn may cause the fall of a government. Until the early 1990s, the 
world was in general characterized by two models of economic development: socialism: led by the 
Soviet Union, and capitalism, led by the United States. The breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990s brought about remarkable democratic reforms across the globe. In the literature there are many 
detailed analyses on the impact of political reforms and democratization on economic growth, mostly 
for the Asian-Pacific region or Latin America. This paper focuses on the effect of political instability 
on economic growth in the CEE transition countries over the last two decades. Political instability in 
this region, reflected in relatively frequent government changes and shuffles, was strongly 
interrelated with the democratization process, which took off at the beginning of the 1990s.  
The motivation to analyze the transition economies of CEE is twofold. First, it seems interesting 
to check whether economic growth in this group of countries, which in last two decades have 
launched a whole range of political, economic and social reforms, has somehow suffered from the 
relatively large amount of political manoeuvres, government changes and major cabinet reshuffles 
which took place in the period 1990-2009. The answering to this question may turn out to provide 
useful information for researchers and politicians, as it may constitute the initial stage of a more 
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complex analysis of the economic consequences of various forms of political instability. Second, to 
the best of our knowledge, this particular group of young democracies has not attracted very much 
the researchers so far, most likely due to a lack of sufficient data. In this contribution we describe the 
dependencies between political instability and economic growth in the CEE region using the most 
recent statistical data and advanced econometric techniques. 
In this paper special attention is paid to those problems which are still unclear in the light of the 
previous literature. The most important issue in this context is the measurement of political 
instability and the direction of causality between the variables under study. First of all we examine 
whether political instability is reflected in the rate of economic growth and to what extent this 
impact is negative. We will also check the existence and sign of reverse causality running from the 
GDP rate to political instability. Moreover, in contrast to previous papers, we try to use objective 
criteria to measure the importance of political events (government change).  
This paper consists of six sections. The following section reviews the major strands of existing 
literature on the relationship between political instability, political freedom, democracy and 
economic growth and it creates a theoretical framework for further empirical analysis. In section 2  
the research conjectures are formulated, mainly on the basis of the results of previous papers. In the 
third section a description of the data used in this study is given. Section 4 contains some remarks 
on the theoretical models which underpin the assumed relationship along with a brief description of 
the methodology used (methodological issues are presented in detail in the Appendix at the end of 
the paper). The empirical results and a discussion of them are presented in section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper and provides some general suggestions for further research. 
 
1. Literature overview 
The nexus between political instability and economic growth has been one of the most important 
topics in empirical research in economics in the last decade. The major goal of this research was to 
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establish the structure of causal interrelations. Sociologists and economists have tried to test whether 
a stable political system is a vital precondition for economic growth or whether economic growth 
creates the foundations of political stability. 
According to the earliest contributions by Kuznets (1966, 1973) technological progress is 
necessary for economic growth, although it must be accompanied by liberal democratic institutions, 
which provide citizens with political freedom, and which allow them to participate in the political 
process. This is coupled with economic freedom, which in turn enables their participation in the 
economy.   
In general, previous papers on political stability-growth links may be classified into four groups. 
The first strand in the economic literature argues that political instability has a negative impact on 
economic growth, but that there is no causality in the opposite direction (see for example Alesina et 
al., 1996). Another group of contributions supplies evidence that economic growth causes political 
stability, but not vice versa (for example Borner and Paldam, 1998). Another tendency in the 
literature argues that causality in the relationship between political instability and economic growth 
runs both ways (Zablotsky, 1996; Gyinmah–Brempong and Traynor, 1999). Finally, the last group of 
papers contains evidence supporting a lack of causality between the variables (see for example 
Campos and Nugent, 2000). In general, previous investigations also vary with respect to the samples 
or countries that different contributors investigate.  
In some of the previous studies on the relationship between the political instability and economic 
growth both direct and indirect effects of instability on GDP have been found and discussed (for 
example Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Schneider and Frey, 1985). The major conclusion 
was that because of the negative impact of political instability, there are indirect consequences for 
most important growth factors such as savings or investment. Another strand of research, also related 
to indirect effects, was focused on the well-known “brain drain” effect (for example, Adebayo, 1985; 
Kwasi, 1992), which is the process of declining human capital caused mainly by political disorder.  
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An issue which is especially related to the nexus between political instability and growth is 
whether democratic institutions are harmful or conducive to growth. In some previous papers, 
democracy was made responsible for not providing enough political stability and for slowing down 
economic growth (for example Yu, 2001; de Haan, 2007). In many democracies the government is 
based on coalition partners, who are often ideologically opposite to each other. Therefore, any 
instability in the relationships between coalition partners can easily lead to a withdrawal of support 
for the government.  
Newly-elected governments in democratic countries often tend to make frequent changes in the 
country’s policy in both domestic and international areas. Even if a particular political party hangs 
onto full executive power, noisy demonstrations on the streets and harsh criticism by the mass media 
can lead to violent and unexpected political change. Sudden and frequent policy changes with regard 
to business are likely to deter investment, which in turn may hamper economic growth. Therefore, 
some contributors think that if democracy leads to this kind of instability, it is unsuitable for 
developing countries where economic growth and the reduction of poverty are top priorities. It is 
very likely that these two goals have been deemed, at least to some extent, main priorities in the case 
of CEE countries as well, especially in the early 1990s. 
The different points of view about the impact of political freedom (accompanied by political 
instability in the early stages of democratization) on the growth rate are widely reflected in the 
economic literature. Barro (1996, 1999) found that the net effect of more political freedom on 
economic growth is rather uncertain. He found that democracy speeds up economic growth when the 
initial level of democracy is relatively low. However, the relationship becomes negative once a 
moderate amount of political freedom has been attained. Barro stressed that an increase in political 
rights in the worst dictatorships supports the growth rate and investment as result of limitations on 
governmental power. However, an attaining a moderate amount of democracy and a further increase 
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in political freedom hampers economic growth and investment because a serious problem with 
redistribution arises.  
There is controversy on the impact of democracy on growth in many other papers. In the opinion 
of Clague et al. (1996) and Haggard (1997) democracy will support economic growth more than 
authoritarian regimes. A democratic political system creates conditions conducive to growth because 
it allows the most active and talented citizens to participate fully in business. Other studies have also 
found a significant positive association between democracy and economic growth, especially in the 
direction from democracy to growth (see for example Nelson and Singh, 1998; Pourgerami, 1988; 
Fedderke and Klitgaard, 1998; de Haan et al. 2006). In a contribution by Nelson and Singh (1998) it 
is emphasized, however, that political freedom and democracy in developing countries could 
undermine the effectiveness of government policy with discipline, law and order. Therefore, under a 
democratic system a government may be less efficient in performing its basic obligations and 
responsibilities, and in supplying basic services. In a paper concerned with economic convergence 
and government policies, Sachs and Warner (1995) found that in order to catch up with rich 
countries, poor countries should implement appropriate economic policies, especially to support 
open foreign trade and to protect private property rights. In the late 1990s Rodrik (1998, 1999) found 
evidence that countries without internal social conflicts and with strong conflict-managing 
institutions grow much faster than countries with a divided society and weak institutions of conflict 
management. 
According to the economic literature political freedom plays a crucial role alongside other 
determinants of economic growth and income convergence. However, views concerning the 
importance of political freedom in the context of economic growth are often extremely controversial. 
Sen (1999) defined development as the process of the growth of real freedoms. He stressed that the 
expansion of freedom, including its political sense, should be the primary end and the principal 
means of the development of countries. In contrast, Friedman (1962) argued that economic freedom 
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is itself a component of the general concept freedom, and that it is a necessary precondition for the 
achievement of political freedom. The most controversial hypothesis albeit quite popular among 
economists, is known as the “Lee conjecture”, named after the former Prime Minister of Singapore, 
Lee Kuan Yew. In his opinion a lack of political freedom supports rapid economic growth, while 
democracy and civil rights hamper it. This conjecture was based on the observation that a few 
authoritarian economies in Asia, that is South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and China, grew much 
faster than their relatively more democratic counterparts. This conjecture was widely discussed by 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and Vasil (2001). Some researchers claim that the Lee hypothesis is 
also supported by the growth in several authoritarian South American countries, which achieved a 
mean annual growth rate of 2.15 per cent in the period 1946-1988, while the average world growth 
was 1.31 per cent in this period. 
Besides the discussions on theoretical issues, the controversy on the role of political systems in 
economic growth is also reflected in the empirical evidence. In one of the earliest empirical studies 
Scully (1988) used a cross-sectional approach to check the interrelations between institutions and 
economic growth in 115 economies between 1960 and 1980. He established that the institutional 
framework had a palpable effect on economic growth. He found that political freedom was the 
reason for the almost three times faster growth in stable democracies than in economies which were 
authoritarian or only partly free. By contrast, de Haan and Siermann (1995, 1996) demonstrated 
(using a sample from the years 1963-1988 and a set of 97 countries) that the positive relationship 
between political freedom and economic growth detected in most cross-sectional empirical studies 
was not robust and depended on political and cultural discrepancies. Similarly, Farr et al. (1998) and 
Wu and Davis (1999) found that political freedom had little influence on economic growth. 
According to these authors most important area of freedom in promoting economic growth is 
economic freedom.  
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Xu and Li (2008) collected data for a sample of 104 countries between 1970 and 2003. They 
found that political freedom has positive effects on economic growth at later stages of social and 
economic development. They found also evidence for the idea that economic freedom has greater 
effects on income convergence in the OECD countries, but that political freedom also promotes 
convergence. 
Alesina et al. (1996) used growth rates of GDP per capita as the dependent variable and 
government changes to measure political instability. They examined a panel of 113 countries and 
found that political instability had negative impact on GDP growth, whereas there was no 
dependence in the opposite direction. Within a similar research framework Campos and Nugent 
(2000) found for African countries that political instability was a reason for slower economic growth. 
However, no relationship was found for any other group of countries.  
To summarize, researchers have not yet reached consensus on the role of democracy in economic 
growth, neither from a theoretical nor empirical perspective. On the other hand, a negative 
relationship between political instability and growth has been reported quite often, some contributors 
even claim that it has been established as a “stylized fact”.1 However, empirical studies on political 
instability-growth links are often criticized due to the large amount of ad-hoc-selected explanatory 
variables and the lack of rigorous stability analysis of the results.2 Moreover, most of the previous 
research in this area was conducted for relatively large groups of countries. This in turn could easily 
lead to modelling difficulties due to possible heterogeneity bias, which is hard to control in simple 
models. Where detailed research has been conducted on a particular region,3 it was usually an 
analysis of some Latin American or Asian case.   
The post-communist CEE economies have not attracted much attention of researchers, mainly 
due to lack of datasets of sufficient size. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first 
contribution to address the political instability-growth nexus in case of this group of young European 
democracies. Moreover, this research deals with some typical but often omitted modelling 
8 
difficulties, as subjectivity of describing the importance of political events and analysis of sensitivity 
of empirical results. As already mentioned, these two issues are crucial for obtaining replicable and 
robust empirical results.    
In the next section we will formulate the main research conjectures of this paper. The hypotheses 
will be formulated on the basis of the empirical results and major suggestions from recent research in 
the area of political instability-economic growth links. 
 
2. Main research conjectures   
As mentioned in the previous section a considerable number of recent papers have emphasized the 
negative impact of political instability on economic growth. Therefore, our first hypothesis reflects 
these expectations in the case of CEE economies in transition:  
CONJECTURE 1: Political instability had a significant and negative impact on the economic 
growth of countries in the CEE region during the period of transition.   
Previous research has shown that the opposite relationship is also often observed, that is a slowdown 
in economic growth may cause a rise in political instability as society puts the poor economic 
performance of a country down to an inferior executive and wishes to unseat the government. To 
summarize, our analysis should verify the following: 
CONJECTURE 2: The economic growth of the transition economies in the CEE region was a 
causal factor for the level of political stability. This impact had a positive sign.   
Testing both these conjectures may provide some important information on the nature of the 
relationship between economic growth and political instability. As well as the direction and sign of 
any causality, it is also important to examine whether political instability had a tendency to remain at 
relatively the same level from one year to the next. It can significantly extend the description of the 
structure of instability-growth links obtained after checking the first two conjectures, because 
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supplementary information on the dynamic structure of these links may be gained. In general, 
previous research has not led to a consensus about the importance and sign of the impact of recent 
political instability on the level of instability in the future. However, following the suggestions of 
Alesina et al. (1996), one may formulate the following: 
CONJECTURE 3: Political instability in the CEE region has shown persistence. 
All the hypotheses listed above will be tested by carefully selected econometric methods. Details on 
the dataset are presented in the next section. 
 
3. The dataset and its properties 
In this paper we use a dataset consisting of a panel of annual observations for new EU members 
in transition from the CEE region.4 In general, the dataset covers the period 1990-2009, although for 
some countries the first observation is often from later than 1990. In other words, our analysis takes 
into account first two decades of the transition of CEE economies. Some details on countries and 
periods included in the analysis are presented in table 1:  
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
In general, the data applied in this paper may be classified into two main categories. The first group 
includes economic variables, which are related to measures of the economic growth of CEE 
transition economies and various proxies of main growth factors.5 Despite years of research, the 
existing literature has not yet reached a consensus about a typical set of variables that may affect 
economic growth. Following previous papers which have reviewed the existing literature (Bleaney 
and Nishiyama, 2002; Levine and Renelt, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 1997, among others) we have 
selected a relatively small subgroup from hundreds of the control variables, which are usually 
considered as most important. The second group of indicators describes various aspects of political 
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instability. Table 2 provides details on all variables along with a definition of some simple 
mathematical operators used to transform the variables in further parts of the paper: 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
The assessment and measurement of the role of government changes or adjustments is not an easy 
goal. In this paper we used the concept of measuring the political instability as the propensity for 
government change, which has attracted a considerable attention in previous research (see for 
example Alesina et al., 1996). However, our measures of political instability are somewhat different 
from those of previous papers. The most important difference lies in the fact that we do not formulate 
any set of subjective criteria to distinguish “major” government changes from the regular transfers of 
executive power. In our definition government change is said to be a major one if a new prime 
minister represents a different political party from the previous one. It is clear that this approach 
reduces the harmful subjectivity bias and allows the use of the most recent data, as no preliminary 
(that is subjective, time-consuming and sample-size-reducing) discussions on the importance of 
government change need to be conducted.7 Moreover, in our opinion this definition is interesting also 
from an economic perspective. It seems to be adequate to capture the real decisions of investors as 
they seldom have the time and resources to perform academic deliberations. Instead, they treat a 
change of prime minister (and the following political reorientation of the executive) as the main 
indicator of the importance of government change which may have some impact on their future 
economic activities. Although one may express some doubts on the importance of all-type 
government change (GCHANGE) for the economic performance of a country, since it mainly covers 
regular elections (which in themselves - except for early elections - are not indicators and/or 
consequences of political instability), we believe that application of this variable may also provide 
some interesting conclusions as it allows comprehensive comparisons between the effects of major 
and regular executive transfers.8 
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Table 3 describes some basis information about our data. In addition, we have presented some 
preliminary results obtained for particular subsamples of the data, which shed some light on the 
possibility of the existence of simultaneous relations between economic growth and both indicators 
of political instability: 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
The average growth rate in CEE economies in the period of transition was around 2.5 per cent. On 
the other hand the average frequency of (major) government change was at a level of 0.46 (0.31), 
which indicates that there was roughly a (major) government change almost every two years (three 
years). The second part of table 3 (related to subsample statistics), provides even more interesting 
results. When we restrict our sample only to years with (major) government change we can see a 
1.15 per cent (0.71 per cent) drop in average growth in comparison to election-free period. A 
negative contemporaneous dependence is also visible from the opposite perspective, as the average 
frequency of both types of government change rises when we restrict the sample to data points 
characterized by GROWTH not greater than the full-sample average.9 
However, this basic approach omits many important issues and does not provide any formal 
evidence for the existence, direction and sign of any causal dependencies between growth and 
political instability. Therefore, in the next section we will present some details on the econometric 
procedures which are most suitable for testing causal dependencies in the context of the specification 
of the variables used.  
 
4. Model specification and methodology 
The findings in the previous section provide some evidence for claiming that both variables 
related to political instability may indeed be simultaneously related with economic growth.10 
Moreover, the propensity for government change is not directly observable, which in the light of the 
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previous remark requires the application of more sophisticated simultaneous equation models, in 
which one of the endogenous variables is continuous and the other is dichotomous.  
4.1 THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The structural form of the model used to examine the dependencies between economic growth and 
political instability in CEE economies includes two equations, where one endogenous variable stands 
for political instability and the other represents economic growth. Thus, we consider the following 
model:                                       
        (1)                                              
*
1 1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 2
,
GROWTH PI X X
PI GROWTH X X
γ β α ε
γ β α ε
 = + + +

= + + +
 
where *PI  is a latent and not directly observable endogenous variable which reflects the actual level 
of political instability. As usual for models with unobservable variables, we assume that there exists 
an indicator variable, denote it PI, which takes the value of 1 if * 0PI >  and 0 otherwise.11 The 
symbol X denotes a set of exogenous variables which enter both equations, while X1 (X2) stands for a 
set of exogenous variables which are only in the growth (political instability) equation. As usual, the 
symbols ε1 and ε2 denote error terms with variances equal to 21σ  and 
2
2σ  respectively, and 
1 2 1 2 1, , , ,γ γ β β α  and 2α  are the vectors of parameters to be estimated.  
In order to test all the research hypotheses formulated in section 2, one should examine specific 
forms of model (1). A crucial step is to decide which variables should enter each equation. In 
general, we assume that the factors determining political instability may be divided into two groups. 
The first one includes measures of economic performance, while the second one contains indicators 
of political unrest. Following the suggestions of Alesina et al. (1996), the set of economic variables 
determining political instability in the initial version of our model consists of the contemporaneous 
growth rate ( GROWTH ), the one-period-lagged growth rate ( 1GROWTH− ) and the one-period-lagged 
world growth rate ( )1WGROWTH− . Since the importance of the first two variables is rather 
straightforward, because they allow a distinction between the contemporaneous and lagged effects of 
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economic growth on political instability, the inclusion of the third one may be helpful in determining 
whether economic performance relative to the rest of the world is relevant to the popularity of a 
government in a particular country. As for measures of political unrest, in the initial model we used 
the 3PI  variable, defined as the average of the past values of PI from a three year period.
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The specification of the growth equation includes contemporaneous political instability (PI) 
defined as the propensity for government change, lagged growth (to measure the persistence of the 
economic growth process), lagged world growth (to capture the possible effect of the world business 
cycle on the growth rates of individual countries) and changes in the unemployment rate. 13 In the 
initial model we have used the employment-related control variable mainly because the labour force 
is assumed to be the most important variable production factor in the short-run (the concept, 
assumptions and features of so-called one-factor production functions are described in Mansfield 
(1991) and Takayama (1985)). 14 
To summarize, the abovementioned justification of the choice of identification restrictions gives us 
1 1[ , ]X GROWTH WGROWTH− −= , 1X UNEMPL= ∆ , 2 3X PI= . Thus, we start our deliberations from an 
initial econometric model, which  may be written as: 
 (2)                 1 11 1 12 1 1 1
2 21 1 22 1 2 3 2
GROWTH PI GROWTH WGROWTH UNEMPL
PI GROWTH GROWTH WGROWTH PI
γ β β α ξ
γ β β α ξ
− −
− −
= + + + ∆ +

= + + + +
 
As mentioned in the introductory subsection we use two different specifications for the instability 
variable, that is we consider PI=GCHANGE and PI=MCHANGE to indicate a change in the sign of 
the latent political instability variable.  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section the results of testing for causal dependencies between the variables under study are 
presented. It is important to note that throughout this section we use the notation introduced in table 
14 
3 to describe the relevant mathematical operators. As already mentioned, at the initial stage of 
empirical research we focus on the group of exactly identified models.15 
5.1 THE NEXUS BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GOVERNMENT CHANGES 
In this subsection we consider the case where PI GCHANGE= , i.e. we define political instability as a 
propensity for any type of government change. Table 4 contains the results of the estimation of 
model (2) through the application of ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE I:16 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
Analysis of the results of the estimation of the growth equation provides evidence of a significant 
(but only at a 10 per cent level) and negative causal impact of GCHANGE on GROWTH. The 
coefficients of both lagged growth rates and the unemployment-related variable were also significant 
(this time even at a 1 per cent level) and had the expected signs, which in turn suggests that in the 
transition period the effects of the persistence of economic growth, the impact of the world business 
cycle and the importance of employment were statistically significant.  
On the other hand, in the government change equation the GROWTH coefficient, although 
slightly negative, was not statistically significant at any usually considered level. Both lagged growth 
rate coefficients were negative, but also statistically insignificant. The 3GCHANGE  coefficient was 
significant (at a 5 per cent level), and negative, implying that the more unstable was the period from 
year t-3 to year t-1 the smaller was the chance of a government change in year t. This suggests that 
the effect of the persistence of political instability was rather negligible. 
In order to confirm the major finding reported in table 4, that is a significant unidirectional and 
negative impact of government change on economic growth with no significant impact of growth (or 
lagged growth) on government change, we ran some additional regressions. In order to perform a 
sensitivity analysis we applied a variety of different sets of control variables in the growth model (1). 
In general, we analyzed all possible ways of constructing 1X  using the control variables (EDUC, 
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OPEN, UNEMPL, INFL). Besides variables in their levels, we also used the transformations of them, 
which were obtained after the application of the three operators described in the last three rows of 
table 3. Therefore, our sensitivity analysis took into account the level, first difference, lagged value 
and average of the lagged values of each one of the four control economic variables. We focused on 
cases where 1X  contains one or two elements.
17 By this means we obtained 112 different variants of 
set 1X : 16 singletons (four variables times four forms of each variable) and 96 two-element 
combinations (six pairs of variables times four forms of first variable times four forms of the second 
variable in each pair).18 For each research variant the ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE I was applied and 
then suitable outcomes were analyzed. The ratios of obtaining significant coefficients at a 10 per cent 
level are presented in table 5:19 
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
As one can see, only some conclusions formulated after the analysis of the outcomes presented in 
table 4 turned out to be robust with respect to the model specification details. The contemporaneous 
negative effect of government change on economic growth was confirmed only in 25 out of 112 
cases. The inverse contemporaneous relation was clearly rejected (a significant relation reported only 
in one case). Similarly, the measure of recent political instability ( 3GCHANGE ) was found to be 
significant and negative in the government change equation in less than half of all cases. However, 
the significant and positive impact of both lagged growth rates turned out to be robust for the growth 
equation, regardless of the variant of 1X  used.   
Since the results presented in tables 4 and 5 provide solid evidence for claiming that economic 
growth does not significantly enter the political instability equation, in the final stage of the 
sensitivity analysis we imposed the restriction 2 0γ = and re-estimated all 112 variants of model (1) 
using the ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE II.20  Table 6 contains the ratios of obtaining significant 
coefficients at a 10 per cent level: 
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
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The empirical results obtained for 112 recursive models are a little different from the results of 
the sensitivity analysis presented in the previous table. First of all, the government change coefficient 
in the growth equation was found to be negative and significant in many more cases (75% of the 
overall amount), although in 28 cases this result was still not confirmed. This time the measure of 
recent political instability ( 3GCHANGE ) was found to be significant in almost 92 per cent of cases. 
The lagged growth coefficients were positive and significant in all growth equations, and 
insignificant in each government change equation. To summarize, we found some evidence in favour 
of Conjecture 1. On the other hand, Conjectures 2 and 3 should rather be rejected. 
The results presented in this subsection provide some evidence for claiming that an increase in the 
propensity for government change has hampered the growth rates of CEE economies during the 
whole transition period. However, after performing the sensitivity analysis some doubts on the 
robustness of this finding also arose. This could be due to the fact that the definition of the indicator 
variable used in this part of the research was strongly influenced by regular government changes, 
which in general do not reflect political instability. Therefore, in the next subsection we examine the 
results of analogous research, this time, however, conducted solely for major government changes.    
5.2. THE NEXUS BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND MAJOR GOVERNMENT CHANGES  
In order to examine the structure of causal links between economic growth and political instability, 
this time defined as a propensity for major government change, we re-estimated the 112 unrestricted 
models introduced in the previous subsection for PI MCHANGE= . In the following table the ratios 
of obtaining significant coefficients at a 10 per cent level are presented:  
INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
The results presented in table 7 lead to the conclusion that major government changes had a 
significant and negative impact on economic growth in about 90 per cent of models tested, while for 
all-type executive transfers this was reported only in about 22 per cent of cases. Similarly, the 
political unrest coefficient ( 3MCHANGE ) was found to be significant and negative in around 73 per 
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cent of cases, while for its analogue in the previous part of the research ( 3GCHANGE ) this ratio was 
around 47 per cent. On the other hand, the results obtained for lagged growth rates in both equations 
were similar to the case of models constructed for GCHANGE .  
Since the results presented in table 7 provide strong evidence for saying that economic growth 
does not significantly enter the major government change equation (i.e. 2 0γ =  in model (1)), in the 
next stage of the research we re-estimated all recursive models using ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE II 
and assuming that PI MCHANGE= . Table 8 contains the ratios of obtaining significant coefficients at 
a 10 per cent level: 
INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
As we can see the results presented in table 8 provide a solid basis for stating that the unidirectional 
negative effect of executive transfers on economic growth was much stronger for major government 
changes than for all types of government changes (including regular ones).  
The difference between the results obtained for major and overall government changes were even 
more distinct when all significance tests were re-run at a 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels. A 
significant negative impact of MCHANGE on GROWTH was confirmed in nearly all cases, while for 
GCHANGE these ratios were definitely much lower (even below 25% for the sensitivity analysis at 
1% level). The ratios of obtaining significant coefficients are presented in table 9: 
INSERT TABLE 9 AROUND HERE 
As can be seen in table 9, we also found strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that for 
government changes, especially major ones, the effect of persistence was not present. To summarize, 
in the case where major government changes were chosen as indicators of political instability, we 
found very convincing evidence in favour of Conjecture 1. On the other hand, our analysis confirmed 
that in this research variant Conjectures 2 and 3 should be definitely rejected. 
Finally, we also examined the sensitivity of the results in the case where 22 : PIX = . We re-ran all 
regressions in basic and recursive variants using indicators of major and all-type government 
18 
changes. In general, the previous results also turned out to be robust to this re-specification of the PI 
equation, thereby confirming the significant and negative impact of government changes, mainly 
major ones, on economic growth. 21 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
CEE economies in transition are a particularly interesting group of countries on which to conduct 
tests on the dependence between political instability and economic growth. Firstly, for the two last 
decades these countries have been transforming themselves from centrally planned systems into 
developed market economies. This process was accompanied by various political reforms and a 
general improvement in social consciousness. The nations of this part of Europe have got new 
opportunities and striven for a better standard of living. One of the most important preconditions of 
this is the quality of the executive. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the period of transition there 
has been quite significant political unrest in CEE countries, as the authorities were forced to satisfy 
the rising expectations of the voters. This paper was intended to investigate whether this political 
unrest and government instability, probably inevitable (at least to some extent) in the first years of 
transition, have indeed hampered the economic growth of this region. Secondly, we wanted to check 
whether the reverse relationship was also significant, that is whether the economic performance of 
these countries was a significant factor in their propensity for government change. To the best of our 
knowledge, all these CEE-related problems have not been investigated by researchers so far.  
In this paper we applied a framework within which political instability is defined as the 
propensity for government change. To distinguish major government changes from regular ones we 
applied an additional indicator variable related to a change of the ruling party. This had the 
advantage of reducing the bias of much-criticized subjective measures of the importance of political 
events. Moreover, we used the most recent time series on economic growth and four economic 
control variables, usually with data from the very first year of the transition of the CEE countries. 
19 
Finally, to check the sensitivity of the empirical results, we examined several hundred possible 
modifications of the initial and restricted models using suitable and recent estimation techniques.  
The empirical results of this paper lead to few major conclusions. First, during the transition 
period of CEE economies the causal dependence between economic growth and political instability 
ran only in one direction – from political instability to growth rate. Moreover, we found convincing 
and robust evidence for saying that this effect was negative and statistically significant for major 
government changes. In the case of all-type government changes (including regular ones) this 
negative impact was robust to the model specification when the sensitivity analysis was conducted at 
a 10 per cent level, although much less convincing results were obtained for a sensitivity analysis 
conducted at a 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels. Both these findings indicate that political instability, 
measured as a propensity for major government change, hampered the economic growth of new EU 
member countries in transition. Another important conclusion is that government changes (major and 
regular) were not persistent, that is more recent political adjustments have reduced the likelihood of 
elections in the following year. Although this is not very surprising for regular government changes 
(as regular elections take place every four years), it has far more important implications for major 
government changes. When we compare this result with the previous remarks (that is a negative 
impact of major changes on growth) we can draw a general conclusion of this paper: Major 
government changes hindered the economic growth of new EU members in transition. However, 
these changes were not persistent. In other words, from the very beginning of the transition of CEE 
economies it is true that political instability was significantly harmful for economic growth. Having 
said that, the empirical results of this paper (that is lack of persistence in government changes) seem 
to confirm that the people of this region have clearly opted for more democracy and stability in 
politics, which in turn has had an indirect positive impact on economic growth. Finally, the lack of 
causality in the opposite direction may suggest that after the collapse of the former authoritarian 
political and economic systems in the CEE, the frequent changes of governments (especially in the 
20 
first decade of transition) were not only due to economic crises and poverty, but primarily due to the 
lack of experienced specialists and politicians who could solve the new problems and face new 
challenges. 
Due to the relatively short time series available, this paper focused solely on short-run 
dependencies. However, when more data is available, an analysis of the long-run dependencies 
between economic growth and political instability in CEE transition economies will be an interesting 
research avenue to extend and supplement the outcomes of this paper. 
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NOTES (MAIN TEXT) 
1 This is not obvious for some groups of countries. For example, in the case of Italy the high number 
of government changes and adjustments over many years was accompanied by relatively high 
economic growth. 
2 Durlauf and Quah (1998) provide excellent review of the empirical literature on this topic. 
3 The fact that political instability-growth links are strongly region-dependent was underlined by 
many authors; see for example Campos and Nugent (2000).   
4 In the period 2004-2007 twelve countries joined the EU. However, Malta and Cyprus have not been 
taken into consideration in this study since the evolution of the economies of these countries is 
significantly different from that of the ten other new EU members, more importantly, the economies 
of Malta and Cyprus have never been in a transition phase.  
5 Since for some of the economic control variables used the data is often published with a two-year 
lag, the sample 1990-2009 was the longest available at the time of preparing this paper.   
21 
6 The impact of human capital on economic growth has frequently been underlined by many authors, 
see for example Alesina et al. (1996), Barro (1991). 
7 This means that the data used in this research is easily obtainable by every Reader, which allows a 
full reproduction of the results or an analysis of some CEE-related research problems not discussed 
in this paper.  
8 Note that even if there was no major government change, the pre-election uncertainty could have a 
significant impact on the performance of an economy (for example an impact on the strategy and 
decisions of investors based solely on their expectations).  
9 In general, both these findings, that is the lower growth in government change periods and the 
higher frequency of government change in periods characterized by below-average growth, were also 
confirmed by the results of similar calculations conducted individually for each country.  
10 The endogenity of measures of political instability and economic growth has been underlined by 
many authors; see for example Gyinmah–Brempong and Traynor (1999), Blanco and Grier (2009). 
11 For more detail on these types of simultaneous models see Maddala (1983). In this paper we 
consider two possible definitions of indicator PI , that is in the first case we set PI GCHANGE= and then 
we set PI MCHANGE= . See table 2 for a description of variables GCHANGE and MCHANGE. 
12 See table 3 for a description of this operator. This type of variable corresponds to the idea of 
measuring persistence of political instability presented in Alesina et al. (1996).  
13 The average of lagged government changes is not considered in the growth equation as they are 
assumed to influence growth only indirectly (through a direct impact on the PI variable). We will 
return to this issue when discussing the empirical results.  
14 In the initial model we decided to use a change in unemployment rather than its level, as we focus 
on growth rates rather than levels of GDP (which are directly influenced by levels of 
unemployment). However, different choices of control variables will be extensively discussed in a 
subsequent part of the paper.  
15 In this paper we will also examine examples of overidentified models, allowing X1 and X2 to have 
different numbers of elements. 
16 Details on the econometric procedures applied (ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE I and ECONOMETRIC 
PROCEDURE II) are presented in the Appendix. Numbers in round brackets denote the significance 
levels of estimated coefficients. 
17 In the cases when X1 was a two-element set and X2 remained unchanged (singleton), we should 
formally examine the issue of overidentifying restrictions. This, however, is rather a minor aspect in 
our research, as our main goal is to describe the causal links between political instability and 
economic growth in CEE countries. In order to reduce the risk of multicollinearity, we restricted the 
sensitivity analysis to cases of no more than two growth-specific control variables in the growth 
equation.  
18  Since an analysis of the significance and signs of the coefficients of the control variables in the 
growth equation is less important for the main goal of this paper, we do not present these results in 
tables 5-9. The detailed results of all estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
22 
19 In order to verify the empirical results we were forced to control not only significance levels but 
also the signs of coefficients. Thus, in tables 5-9 in the round brackets the numbers of significant 
parameters with expected sign are additionally presented. For example, the notation “48/96 (47-)” 
denotes finding statistically significant coefficient in 48 out of 96 models examined. Moreover, the 
signs of the statistically significant coefficients were negative in 47 out of the 48 cases. 
20 Model (1) with the restriction 1 0=γ  or 2 0γ =  is called a recursive model. In such cases the 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE I should be replaced by a more adequate estimation technique. The 
suitable estimation method, referred to as the ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE II, is described in detail in 
the Appendix at the end of the paper. 
21 These supplementary results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
A.1. GENERAL REMARKS 
The estimation of model (1) cannot be performed through the application of standard econometric 
methods (such as 2SLS and so forth), as one of the dependent variables is latent. A suitable 
estimation procedure was presented in Maddala (1983). Since nowadays this method is a standard 
econometric procedure, we will only provide a brief description of it. 
Because political instability, i.e. *PI , is not directly observable, in the initial stage one should 
define22 ( ) 1** * 2PI PI σ
−= and then rewrite model (1) in the following form:  
(3)                                                            **1 2 1 1 1 1GROWTH PI X Xγ σ β α ε= + + +  
(4)                                                ** 2 2 2 22
2 2 2 2
.PI GROWTH X Xγ β α ε
σ σ σ σ
= + + +  
After defining the set ALLX , which contains all the exogenous variables that occur in both equations in 
model (1),23 the following estimation procedure of the system of simultaneous equations should be 
performed: 
23 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE I 
STEP 1: Estimate through OLS the model 1 1ALLGROWTH X η= Π + , where 1Π  stands for the vector 
of parameters and 1η  stands for error term. Denote the predicted values as HATGROWTH . 
STEP 2: Estimate through probit the model ** 2 2ALLPI X η= Π + , where 2Π  stands for the vector of 
parameters and 2η  stands for the error term. Denote the predicted values as **HATPI . 
STEP 3: In the next stage rewrite models (3) and (4) placing the fitted values obtained in STEP 1 
and STEP 2 on the right hand side of both equations: 
 (5)                                             **1 1 1 1 1HATGROWTH PI X Xγ β α ξ′ ′ ′= + + +  
(6)                                             ** 2 2 2 2 2HATPI GROWTH X Xγ β α ξ′ ′ ′= + + +  
and then use OLS and probit to re-estimate equations (5) and (6) respectively. 
STEP 4: After estimating models (5) and (6) it is necessary to correct the standard errors, because 
the estimation in STEP 3 was based on **HATPI  and HATGROWTH , not on an appropriate **PI  and 
GROWTH variables, which biases the estimators of standard errors (and the results of significance 
tests). Maddala (1983) provides a relatively simple algorithm for correcting standard errors. To 
save space we will not present the full details of this method. A practical implementation of this 
procedure along with a theoretical description may be found in Keshk (2003).24   
In the next subsection we will characterize the estimation procedures used in cases when a 
simultaneous effect is present in exactly one of equations in model (1).    
A.2. RECURSIVE MODELS 
If some preliminary calculations (or economic theory) provide a solid basis for assuming that 
exactly one of parameters 1γ  and 2γ  equals zero in model (1), then a simultaneous model turns into a 
recursive model. As a consequence, the general procedure presented in subsection A.1 should be 
replaced by more adequate methods. The details of estimation procedures depend on which 
restriction: 01 =γ  or 02 =γ  is imposed. 
24 
A.2.1. THE RESTRICTION 1 0=γ  
This corresponds to the problem of the estimation of a probit model with continuous endogenous 
covariates. Suitable estimation techniques for this type of model are well-known, thus we will not 
provide a detailed description. The theoretical fundamentals of these estimation techniques may be 
found in Newey (1987). The author proposed a suitable application of Amemiya’s Generalized Least 
Squares (AGLS; see Amemiya, 1978) estimator in order to efficiently estimate the parameters of a 
probit model, when it includes a continuous endogenous regressor. This procedure is currently one of 
the standard ways of estimating the variant of model (1) discussed above.25 
 
 
A.2.2. THE RESTRICTION 2 0γ =  
In general the condition 02 =γ  generates two interesting situations. First, if the continuous 
variable is only observed given some selection criterion defined by the latent endogenous variable, 
we have an example of what is known as a sample selection model. It is clear that this kind of 
specification cannot be applied in the case of our model (as growth is always observed), so we will 
not discuss it in detail. For a detailed discussion of such models and their methods of estimation see 
Barnow et al. (1981), Breen (1996), and Maddala (1983).26 
When there is no solid reason to make use of a sample selection model, the condition 02 =γ  
implies a typical recursive model with a continuous and latent variable. Methods for fitting such 
models are discussed in detail in Maddala and Lee (1976). 
In order to briefly describe these estimation procedures consider the initial form of the (recursive) 
model:27 
(7)                                                                *1 1 2 1 1 1 1y y X Xγ β α ζ′′ ′′ ′′= + + +  
(8)                                                         *2 2 2 2 2y X Xβ α ζ′′ ′′= + +  
In general the maximum likelihood function takes the form (Maddala and Lee, 1976): 
25 
 (9)                                            2 2
1 2
1
1 2 1 2
,
( , 1) ( , 0) ,y y
y y
L g y y g y y − = = = ∏  
where the joint density function of 1 2( , )y y  is defined as:  
  (10)                                       ( )
2 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2( , 1) ,
X X
g y y f y X X d
β α
γ β α ζ ζ
′′ ′′+
−∞
′′ ′′ ′′= = − − −∫  
and 
   (11)                                 ( )
2 2 2
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2( , 0) ,
X X
g y y f y X X d
β α
β α ζ ζ
∞
′′ ′′+
′′ ′′= = − −∫  
and 1 2( , )f ζ ζ  denotes the joint density function of error term 1 2( , )ζ ζ . 
If the error terms in (7) and (8) are independent then (9) takes the form: 
  (12)                 ( ) ( ) 22
1 2
1
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) 1 ( ) ,
yy
y y
L f y y X X F X X F X Xγ β α β α β α − ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= − − − + − + ∏ ∏  
where f stands for the density functions of error term 1ζ and F denotes the cumulative distribution 
function of error term 2ζ . Thus, maximizing L is equivalent to maximizing likelihood functions for 
both equations separately. Of course if 1ζ  and 2ζ are both normally distributed this means that 
equation (7) may be estimated through OLS and (8) through probit. 
From our perspective a much more interesting case is when 1ζ  and 2ζ  are not independent.
28 As 
mentioned by Maddala and Lee (1976), in this case we have to obtain consistent initial estimates to 
start the iteration of the maximizing likelihood procedure. If we assume that the error term has a two-
dimensional normal distribution:29 
 (13)                                                       
2
1 1 12
2 12
0
~ ,
0 1
N
ζ σ σ
ζ σ
     
           
 
we can get consistent initial estimates for an iteration-based maximization of (9) quite easily after 
performing the following procedure: 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE II 
STEP 1: Estimate (8) through probit.  
26 
STEP 2: Rewrite (7) in the form: 
   (14)                             1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) ( ( ))
( )
y X X F X X y F X X
X X F X X
β α γ β α γ β α ζ
β α γ β α ω
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + + − + + =
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + +
 
where 1 2 2 2 2 1( ( ))y F X Xω γ β α ζ′′ ′′ ′′= − + + . Next estimate the model:  
(15)                                                   1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2( )y X X F X Xβ α γ β α ω′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= + + + +  
and denote the vectors of the estimated coefficients as 1 1,β α′′ ′′

  and 1γ ′′
 . Next denote the estimated 
residuals of the first equation as 1 1 1 1 1 1 2y X X yζ β α γ′′ ′′ ′′= − − −
 
  . 
STEP 3: Calculate a consistent estimator of 21σ  using formula ( ) ( )
2 12
1 1
1
T
i
Tσ ζ −
=
 
=  
 
∑

 , where T 
denotes the sample size. 
STEP 4: Regress through OLS the following equation: 
(16)                                                                            ,Z aU η= +  
where 1 1 1 1:Z y X Xβ α′′ ′′= − −

 , ( ) ( )( )
2
2 2 2
1 1
2
2 2 2
1:
2
X X
U e F X X
β α
β α
π
−′′ ′′− + 
′′ ′′= − + 
 



 and η  is the error term. The 
consistent estimator of 12σ is equal to the estimator a
  obtained from (16). 
ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE II provides consistent estimators of the unknown parameters of (7) and 
(8), which then may be used as initial values in the iterating procedure of maximising the likelihood 
function (9).30 
NOTES (APPENDIX) 
22 This is done only for presentation purposes. In general, we could follow the traditional approach 
and simply at the beginning assume that the error term in the second equation in model (1) has a unit 
variance. 
23 Using the traditional notation based on an observation matrix this definition could be expressed by 
the formula: ( )1 2ALL C CX X X X= + + , where matrices X , 1X  and 2X are defined in model (1) while “ C+ ” 
denotes a column-wise concatenation operator, that is if 1,..,
1,...,
ij i n
j m
A a =
=
 =    and 1,..,
1,...,
ij i n
j k
B b =
=
 =   then 
1,..,
1,...,
: i nC is
s m k
A B c =
= +
+ =    where 
if
if
is
is
ij
a s m
c
b s m j
≤=  = +
. 
27 
24 ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE I is directly available in STATA software throughout the application of 
command “cdsimeq”. 
25 Professional econometric software (for example STATA) offers several possibilities of estimating 
such models. However, as mentioned in Adkins (2009) it is also relatively easy to implement this 
variant of AGLS procedure in all open-source economic software, as long as some basic 
programming is applicable. 
26 STATA’s procedure “treatreg” can perform all the necessary estimations for such models in two-
stage and maximum likelihood variants. 
27 To present suitable formulas in a transparent way we use the shortened notation: 1 =y GROWTH  and 
* **
2y PI= ( )2y PI= . 
28 Compare the indications of significant simultaneity reported in table 3. 
29 As already mentioned, the unit variance of 2ζ comes directly from the specification of models (3) 
and (4), but one just might as well assume this condition in model (1) without loss of the generality 
of further results. 
30 The STATA procedure “cmp” allows an estimation of this type of recursive models. See Roodman 
(2011) for more details. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1. Countries and periods analyzed in this paper 
COUNTRY SAMPLE PERIOD 
Bulgaria 1990-2009 
Czech Republic 1993-2009 
Estonia 1991-2009 
Hungary 1990-2009 
Latvia 1991-2009 
Lithuania 1991-2009 
Poland 1990-2009 
Romania 1990-2009 
Slovakia 1993-2009 
Slovenia 1991-2009 
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 TABLE 2. Brief description of data and operators used in this paper 
Full name 
Abbreviation 
used 
Definition Unit 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
GDP growth 
rate* 
GROWTH 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
% 
Tertiary school 
enrolment* 
EDUC 
Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of tertiary 
education. This indicator is often used to measure the level of human capital.6 
% 
Trade 
openness** 
OPEN 
Exports plus imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The 
export and import figures are in national currencies from the World Bank and 
United Nations data archives.  
% 
Unemployment 
rate* 
UNEMPL 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. 
% 
Inflation rate* INFL 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services. 
% 
World growth 
rate* 
WGROWTH 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
% 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY VARIABLES 
Major 
government 
change 
MCHANGE 
This variable is equal to one if there was a substantial government change, that is if 
new prime minister was representing a different party than the previous one. We 
also assumed that whenever outgoing or new prime minister was not a member of 
political party MCHANGE took the value 1. 
- 
Government 
change 
GCHANGE 
This variable is equal to one if there was any type of government change (major or 
just regular), and zero otherwise.  
- 
MATHEMATICAL OPERATORS 
Name Parameters The symbol used and result of transforming series ( ) 1,..,t t Nx x ==  
Lag operator  p ( ) 1,...,:p t p t p Nx x− − = +=  
Differencing operator -  ( )1 2,...,: t t t Nx x x − =∆ = −  
Lagged-average operator n  1:
n
i
i
n
x
x
n
−
==
∑
 
*   data from World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank 
** data from Penn World Table 7.0 
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 TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics of examined data 
FULL SAMPLE STATISTICS 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES POLITICAL INSTABILITY VARIABLES 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
GROWTH 2.55 5.65 
MCHANGE 0.31 0.43 EDUC 43.54 19.41 
OPEN 106.83 32.72 
UNEMPL 10.57 4.71 
GCHANGE 0.46 0.49 INFL 30.24 93.49 
WGROWTH 2.65 1.49 
SUBSAMPLE STATISTICS 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Restriction 
GROWTH 
2.11 5.89 MCHANGE=1 
2.82 5.51 MCHANGE=0 
1.95 6.16 GCHANGE=1 
3.10 5.10 GCHANGE=0 
MCHANGE 
0.28 0.46 GROWTH greater than full-sample average 
0.33 0.47 GROWTH not greater than full-sample average 
GCHANGE 
0.41 0.49 GROWTH greater than full-sample average 
0.56 0.51 GROWTH not greater than full-sample average 
 
TABLE 4. Results of estimation of model (2) with PI GCHANGE=  
 COEFFICIENTS ESTIMATES 
 Growth equation 
Political instability 
(government change) 
equation 
GROWTH - -0.03 (0.72) 
GCHANGE -2.60 (0.09)  
1GROWTH−  0.34 (0.00) -0.39 (0.28) 
1WGROWTH−  0.89 (0.01) -0.07 (0.54) 
∆UNEMPL  -0.52 (0.01) - 
3GCHANGE  - -0.82 (0.04) 
Constant -0.98 (0.26) 0.48 (0.15) 
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 TABLE 5. Sensitivity analysis for model (1) with different control variables and PI GCHANGE=  
 SINGLETON X1 TWO-ELEMENT X1 
 
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change equation 
GROWTH - 0/16 - 1/96 (1-) 
GCHANGE 4/16 (4-) - 21/96 (21-)  
1GROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 0/16  96/96 (96+) 0/96   
1WGROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 0/16  91/96 (91+) 0/96  
3GCHANGE  - 5/16 (5-) - 48/96 (47-)  
 
TABLE 6. Sensitivity analysis in recursive models ( 2 0γ = , PI GCHANGE= ) 
 SINGLETON X1 TWO-ELEMENT X1 
 
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Government 
change 
equation 
GCHANGE 11/16 (11-) - 75/96 (73-)  
1GROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 0/16  96/96 (96+) 0/96 
1WGROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 0/16 96/96 (96+) 0/96 
3GCHANGE  - 15/16 (15-) - 90/96 (88-) 
 
TABLE 7. Sensitivity analysis for model (1) with different control variables and PI MCHANGE=  
 SINGLETON X1 TWO-ELEMENT X1 
 
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
GROWTH - 1/16 (1-) - 2/96 (2-) 
MCHANGE 15/16 (15-) - 86/96 (85-)  
1GROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 1/16 (1-) 96/96 (96+) 1/96 (1-) 
1WGROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 1/16 (1-) 95/96 (95+) 0/96  
3MCHANGE  - 10/16 (10-) - 72/96 (72-) 
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 TABLE 8. Sensitivity analysis in recursive models ( 2 0γ = , PI MCHANGE= ) 
 SINGLETON X1 TWO-ELEMENT X1 
 
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
Growth 
equation 
Major 
government 
change equation 
MCHANGE 16/16 (16-) - 96/96 (96-) - 
1GROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 0/16 96/96 (96+) 0/96 
1WGROWTH−  16/16 (16+) 0/16 96/96 (96+) 0/96 
3MCHANGE  - 16/16 (16-)  - 96/96 (96-) 
 
TABLE 9. Results of joint sensitivity analysis in recursive models ( 2 0γ = ) 
 
5 PER CENT LEVEL 
[1 PER CENT LEVEL] 
 PI MCHANGE=  PI GCHANGE=  
 Growth equation 
Political 
instability 
equation 
Growth equation 
Political 
instability 
equation 
PI 
112/112 (112-) 
[110/112 (110-)] 
- 
[-] 
75/112 (75-) 
[26/112 (26-)] 
- 
[-] 
1GROWTH−  
112/112 (111+) 
[112/112 (111+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
112/112 (112+) 
[112/112 (112+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
1WGROWTH−  
112/112 (112+) 
[112/112 (112+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
112/112 (112+) 
[112/112 (112+)] 
0/112 
[0/112] 
3PI  
- 
[-] 
112/112 (112-)  
[112/112 (112-)] 
- 
[-] 
110/112 (110-) 
[106/112 (106-)] 
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